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Abstract 
This paper presents experimental results of cluster analysis using self organising neural networks for 
identifying failing banks.  The paper first describes major reasons and likelihoods of bank failures.  
Then it demonstrates an application of a self-organising neural network and presents results of the 
study.  Findings of the paper demonstrate that a self-organising neural network is a powerful tool for 
identifying potentially failing banks.  Finally, the paper discusses some of the limitations of cluster 
analysis related to understanding of the exact meaning of each cluster. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2008, a series of bank failures triggered a financial crisis.  By any historical standard, this crisis 
was the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s.  The immediate cause of the crisis was the 
bursting of the United States housing bubble.  This, in turn, caused the values of securities tied to real 
estate pricing to nose-dive, damaging financial institutions worldwide.  Bank insolvencies and lack of 
credits reduced the investor confidence and, as a result, the stock market plummeted.  In 2009, the 
global economy contracted by 1.1%, while in advanced countries, the contraction reached 3.4%. After 
intervention by central banks and governments of an unprecedented scale, the global economy began 
to recover.  However, the global financial system remains at risk. 
The danger of cascading failures of major banks would be reduced significantly if we could 
identify banks with potential problems before they face solvency and liquidity crises.  There are many 
reasons for bank failures.  These include high risk-taking, interest rate volatility, poor management 
practices, inadequate accounting standards, and increased competition from non-depository 
institutions.  Since the crisis, bank regulators have been increasingly concerned with reducing the size 
of deposit insurance liabilities.  It has even been suggested that the best regulatory policy is to close 
banks before they become undercapitalised.  Therefore, identifying potentially failing banks as early 
as possible is essential for avoiding another major financial crisis. 
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Over the last thirty years many tools have been developed to identify problem banks.  While early 
models mostly relied on statistical techniques (Abrams & Huang, 1987; Booth et al., 1989; Espahbodi, 
1991), most recent developments are based on fuzzy logic and neural networks (Zhang et al., 1999;  
Alam et.al., 2000; Ozkan-Gunay & Ozkan, 2007).  Most of these models use a dichotomous 
classification – bankruptcy versus non-bankruptcy.  In real world, however, banks are ranked in terms 
of their likelihood of bankruptcy.  What regulators really need is an early warning system that can 
“flag” potentially failing banks.  Once such banks are identified, different preventive programs 
tailored to each bank’s specific needs can be put in place, thereby avoiding a major banking failure. 
In this paper, we “flag” potentially failing banks using cluster analysis. 
2 Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis is an exploratory data analysis technique that divides different objects into groups, 
called clusters, in such a way that the degree of association between two objects is maximised if they 
belong to the same cluster and minimised otherwise. 
The term “cluster analysis” was first introduced over 70 years ago by Robert Tryon (1939).  Since 
then, cluster analysis has been successfully applied in many fields including medicine, archeology, 
astronomy, etc.  In clustering, there are no predefined classes – objects are grouped together only on 
the basis of their similarity.  For this reason, clustering is often referred to as unsupervised 
classification.  There is no distinction between independent and dependent variables, and when 
clusters are found the user needs to interpret their meaning. 
We can identify three major methods used in cluster analysis.  These are based on statistics, fuzzy 
logic and neural networks.  In this case study, we will apply a self-organising neural network. 
In this paper, we “flag” potentially failing banks using cluster analysis. 
3 Bank Rating System 
Our goal is to cluster banks using their financial data.  The data can be obtained from annual 
reports of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  The FDIC is an independent agency 
created by the Congress of the United States. It insures deposits, examines and supervises financial 
institutions, and manages receiverships.  To assess the overall financial state of a bank, regulators use 
the CAMELS (Capital adequacy, Asset, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market 
risk) rating system.  The CAMELS ratings have been applied to 8,500 banks in the U.S.  It was also 
used by the United States government in selecting banks for the capitalisation program of 2008. 
For our case study, we select 100 banks and obtain their financial data from the FDIC annual 
report for the last year.  We adapt the following five ratings based on the CAMELS system: 
1. NITA – Net Income divided by Total Assets.  NITA represents return on assets.  Failing banks 
have very low or even negative values of NITA. 
2. NLLAA – Net Loan Losses divided by Adjusted Assets.  Adjusted assets are calculated by 
subtracting the total loans from the total assets.  Failing banks usually have higher NLLAA values 
than healthy banks. 
3. NPLTA – Non-Performing Loans divided by Total Assets.  Non-performing loans consist of loans 
that have past their due dates by 90 days and non-accrual loans.  Failing banks usually have higher 
values of NPLTA than healthy banks. 
4. NLLTL – Net Loan Losses divided by Total Loans.  Failing banks have higher loan losses as they 
often make loans to high-risk borrowers.  Thus, failing banks usually have higher values of 
NLLTL than healthy banks. 
5. NLLPLLNI – Sum of Net Loan Losses and Provision for Loan Losses divided by Net Income.  The 
higher the NLLPLLNI value, the poorer the bank performance. 
Preliminary investigations of the statistical data can reveal that a number of banks may experience 
some financial difficulties.  Clustering should help us to identify groups of banks with similar 
problems. 
4 Self-Organising Map 
Figure 1 shows a self-organising map (SOM) with a 5-by-5 array of 25 neurons in the Kohonen 
layer.  Note that neurons in the Kohonen layer are arranged in a hexagonal pattern. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The SOM structure 
The input data are normalised to be between 0 and 1.  The network is trained for 10,000 iterations 
with a learning rate of 0.1.  After training is complete, the SOM forms a semantic map where similar 
input vectors are mapped close together while dissimilar apart.  In other words, similar input vectors 
tend to excite either the same neuron or neurons closely located to each other in the Kohonen layer.  
This SOM property can be visualised using the weight distance matrix, also known as the U-matrix.  
Figure 2 shows the U-matrix and the SOM sample hit plot for the bank financial data.  In the U-
matrix, the hexagons represent the neurons in the Kohonen layer.  The colours in the regions between 
neighbouring neurons indicate the distances between them – the darker the colour the greater the 
distance.  The SOM sample hit plot reveals how many input vectors are attracted by each neuron of 
the Kohonen layer. 
Typically, a SOM identifies fewer clusters than the number of neurons in the Kohonen layer, and 
thus several input vectors attracted by close neighbouring neurons may, in fact, represent the same 
cluster.  For instance, in Figure 2(a), we can observe that distances between neurons 3 – 8, 7 – 8, 7 – 
12, 7 – 13, 8 – 9, 8 – 13, 8 – 14, 9 – 14, 11 – 12, 12 – 13, 12 – 16, 12 – 17, 13 – 14, 13 – 17, 13 – 18, 
14 – 19, 16 – 17, 17 – 18, 17 – 22, 17 – 23, 18 – 19, 18 – 23, 21 – 22 and 22 – 23 are relatively short 
(the colours in the regions between neighbouring neurons are lighter, so the distances are shorter).  
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Thus, we can reasonably assume that neurons 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22 and 23 
form a single cluster.  At the same time, we should also notice that the distance between neurons 3 and 
7 is much greater than the distances between neurons 3 and 8, and 7 and 8.  Therefore, it might be 
useful to examine what makes the input vectors associated with neuron 3 so different from these 
attracted by neuron 7.  Table 1 shows results of clustering. Interpreting the meaning of each cluster is 
often a difficult task.  Unlike classification where the number of classes is decided beforehand, in 
SOM-based clustering the number of clusters is unknown, and assigning a label or interpretation to 
each cluster requires some prior knowledge and domain expertise. 
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Figure 2: The 5-by 5 SOM after training: (a) the U-matrix; (b) the sample hit plot 
 
For a start, we need a way to compare different clusters. As we discussed in Case Study 6, the 
centre of a cluster often reveals features that separate one cluster from another. Therefore, determining 
the average member of a cluster should enable us to interpret the meaning of the entire cluster. In 
Table 1, the last column “Financial profile of the cluster” contains mean, median and standard 
deviation (STD) values of the CAMELS ratings utilised in this study.  Using these values an expert 
can identify groups of banks that exhibit similar patterns of behaviour or experience similar problems. 
Let us begin out analysis by identifying problem banks with negative returns on their assets.  As 
can be seen in Table 1, three clusters, E, F and G, have negative values of NITA.  For example, banks 
included in Cluster E have mean net losses of 0.06% of their total assets.  On the other hand, healthy 
banks usually report a positive return on their assets.  Thus, banks included in Cluster A, which has the 
highest value of NITA, could be considered healthy. 
highest mean value, followed by Cluster E.  Note that although banks in Cluster E are problem 
banks, their NLLAA values are at least 12 times lower than these of Cluster D (a 3.63% mean against 
44.48%).  This could be a clear indication that the three banks associated with Cluster D experience 
severe difficulties with their loans (even though they still have a positive return on their assets).  
Banks in Clusters A, B and C show negative NLLAA values, which is normal for healthy banks. 
The value of NPLTA is highest for Cluster B, followed by the problem banks in Clusters E, F and 
G.  This may indicate that the bank in Cluster B (Cluster B is a solitary cluster) experiences difficulties 
in recovering its loans.  In fact, the situation with this particular bank could be even worse than with 
the problem banks associated with Clusters E, F and G. 
Finally, the values of NLLTL and NLLPLLNI are highest for the two banks in Cluster H, followed 
by the problem banks.  Because higher values of NLLTL indicate higher loan losses, we may find that 
banks in Cluster H are involved in providing loans to high-risk borrowers.  High risk-taking also 
contributed to the poor performance of these banks, reflected by the high NLLPLLNI values. 
An important part of cluster analysis is to identify outliers, objects that do not naturally fall into 
any larger cluster.  As can be seen in Table 1, there are three banks that are viewed as solitary clusters 
– Cluster B, Cluster F and Cluster G.  These banks are outliers, and each of them has a unique 
financial profile.  While conventional clustering algorithms, such as K-means clustering, do not handle 
outliers well, a SOM can easily identify them. 
It is difficult, however, to determine the number of clusters in a multidimensional data set.  In fact, 
when a clustering algorithm attempts to create larger clusters, outliers are often forced into these 
clusters.  This may result not only in poorer clustering but, even worse, in failing to distinguish unique 
objects. 
As an example, let us cluster the same set of banks using a 2-by-2 SOM.  The SOM is trained for 
1,000 iterations.  Figure 3 shows the U-matrix and the SOM sample hit plot.  Obviously, now we have 
only four clusters.  Further investigation reveals that based on their average values, banks associated 
with neurons 1, 2 and 3 can be classified as healthy, while 13 banks attracted by neuron 4 as failing.  
Two failing banks and two banks with unusually high values of NLLPLLNI, previously identified by 
the 5-by-5 SOM, are now absorbed by the “healthy” cluster. 
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Figure 3: The 2-by 2 SOM after training: (a) the U-matrix; (b) the sample hit plot 
5 SOM Testing 
In order to test a neural network, including a SOM, we need a test set.  From the FDIC Annual 
Report we can obtain a list of failed banks, and collect appropriate financial statement data.  Several 
studies of bank failures suggest that failed banks could be detected between six and 12 months before 
the call date, and in some cases as early as four years before a bank fails (Alam et al., 2000; 
Eichengreen, 2002).  Although solvency and liquidity are the most important predictors of failure 
close to the call date, asset quality, earnings and management practices become increasingly 
significant as the time before failure increases.  To test the SOM performance, we select 10 banks that 
failed last year, and collect their one-year-prior financial statement data.  Table 2 contains mean, 
median and standard deviation (STD) values of their CAMELS ratings.  Now we can apply 10 input 
vectors to see the SOM response. 
As expected, in the 2-by-2 SOM, all 10 input vectors are attracted by neuron 4.  In the 5-by-5 
SOM, the situation is more complicated.  Six input vectors are attracted by neuron 5, two by neuron 
10, one by neuron 20 and two by neuron 24.  Thus, in both cases, failing banks are clustered correctly. 
Finally, a word of caution.  Although a SOM is a powerful clustering tool, the exact meaning of 
each cluster is not always clear, and a domain expert is usually needed to interpret the results.  Also a 
SOM is a neural network, and any neural network is only as good as the data that goes into it.  In this 
case study, we have used only five financial variables.  However, to identify problem banks well in 
advance of their failure, we might need many more variables that hold additional information about 
bank performance (researchers in the industry use up 29 financial variables based on the CAMELS 
rating system). 
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A good example of challenges associated with clustering is given in Berry & Linoff (2004).  A 
large bank decided to increase its market share in home equity loans.  It gathered data on 5,000 
customers who had home equity loans and 5,000 customers who did not have them.  The data included 
appraised value of a house, amount of credit available, amount of credit granted, customer age, marital 
status, number of children and household income.  The data was then used to train a SOM.  It 
identified five clusters.  One of the clusters was particularly interesting.  It contained customers who 
took home equity loans.  These customers were in their forties, married with children in their late 
teens.  The bank assumed that they were taking loans to pay college tuition fees for their children.  
Thus, the bank organised a marketing campaign to offer home equity loans as a means to pay for 
college education.  However, results of the campaign were disappointing. 
Further investigation revealed that the problem was in the interpretation of the clusters identified 
by the SOM.  Consequently, the bank decided to include more information about its customers such as 
type of accounts, deposit system, credit card system, etc.  After retraining the SOM, it was discovered 
that customers who took home equity loans in addition to being in their forties with college-age 
children often also had business accounts.  So, the bank concluded that when children left home to go 
to college, parents took out home equity loans to start new businesses.  The bank organised a new 
marketing campaign targeting this group of potential customers, and this time the campaign was 
successful. 
6 Conclusions 
A very large number of bank failures in 2008 triggered a financial crisis.  Although unprecedented 
intervention of central banks and governments helped economies to recover, the global financial 
systems remains at risk.  As a result, identifying failing banks as early as possible is essential.  This 
paper has clearly demonstrated a great potential of a self-organising neural network as a tool for 
performing this task. The results show that self-organising maps can successfully carry out bank 
clustering tasks and identify banks that require immediate attention from the regulatory bodies. 
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to college, parents took out home equity loans to start new businesses.  The bank organised a new 
marketing campaign targeting this group of potential customers, and this time the campaign was 
successful. 
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